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Abstract. In a persistent multi-agent system, it should be possible for new agents
to bene¯t from the accumulated learning of more experienced agents. Parallel
reasoning can be applied to the case of newborn animals, and thus the biological
literature on social learning may aid in the construction of e®ective multi-agent
systems. Biologists have looked at both the functions of social learning and the
mechanisms that enable it. Many researchers have focused on the cognitively com-
plex mechanism of imitation; we will also consider a range of simpler mechanisms
that could more easily be implemented in robotic or software agents. Research in
arti¯cial life shows that complex global phenomena can arise from simple local rules.
Similarly, complex information sharing at the system level may result from quite
simple individual learning rules. We demonstrate in simulation that simple mecha-
nisms can outperform imitation in a multi-agent system, and that the e®ectiveness
of any social learning strategy will depend on the agents' environment. Our simple
mechanisms have obvious advantages in terms of robustness and design costs.
Keywords: Multi-agent systems, social learning, imitation, arti¯cial life, biology.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the ¯eld of arti¯cial intelligence, learning is usually a process through which
a solitary agent acquires information about regularities in its environment, and
then uses that information to guide its behaviour. In a multi-agent system, it is
certainly possible to equip many agents with mechanisms allowing each one to learn
individually. However, it has recently been argued [1] that employing learning in the
context of a multi-agent system may actually change the nature of the learning task,1002 J. Noble, D.W. Franks
and make novel forms of learning possible. Consider a persistent multi-agent system
in which new agents enter a world already populated with experienced agents. In one
sense, a new agent begins with a blank slate, as it has not yet had an opportunity to
learn about its environment. (Of course the agent will likely be hard-wired with an
initial set of behaviours to allow it to get started.) However, a new agent may not
need to ¯nd out everything about the environment for itself: it may well be possible
to bene¯t from the accumulated learning of the population of more experienced
agents.
This situation could characterize highly autonomous software agents operating
on the internet, for example. A new agent has not yet learned which search engine
to try ¯rst, or which auction site o®ers the best bargains. The agent will probably
do best by starting with the sites used most frequently by its peers. Note, however,
that the situation described also matches the learning problem facing a newborn
animal. For all but the most solitary of species, there is valuable information to be
gleaned from the behaviour of others. For example, why should a rat risk poisoning
by sampling potential foodstu®s at random when it can simply eat the same things
that other rats in the same nest are eating? In biology, learning in multi-agent
systems has been studied for some time under the heading social learning. There
may be lessons in the biological literature for those who are interested in engineering
e®ective multi-agent systems.
Researchers in animal behaviour are increasingly in agreement that social learn-
ing is an important element in the overall adaptive strategy of many species (see the
book by Heyes and Galef [2] for a general review, or the book by Box and Gibson [3]
for case studies on social learning in mammals). From lion cubs learning about how
to bring down prey, to rats learning through smell about which foods are safe to eat,
it is clear that animals use the behaviour of their more experienced peers as a source
of valuable information. However, in reviewing the literature on social learning, we
often ¯nd that although investigators believe social learning to be occurring in a
particular species, there is very little known about the speci¯c mechanisms that un-
derlie it. For example, in Box and Gibson's edited collection [3], many contributors
discuss the ecology of their chosen species in order to illustrate the likely roles that
social learning may play, but can only speculate about exactly how the animals in
question actually learn through the observation of another's behaviour.
Another curious fact about the social learning literature is the emphasis on
imitation as a potential mechanism. Imitation | or \imitative learning" [4, p. 324]
| is a cognitively complex process that requires an animal to not only perceive and
reproduce the bodily movements of another, but to understand the changes in the
environment caused by the other animal's behaviour, and ¯nally to be able to grasp
the \intentional relations" between these, i.e., to know how and why the behaviour is
supposed to bring about the goal. This emphasis on imitation is particularly strong
in the case of work on primates [5]. A focus on imitation is not surprising: it is
likely to be implicated in the explosive cultural evolution of our own species, and so
we have a natural curiosity about the extent to which other animals in general, and
our primate cousins in particular, might share this ability. Nevertheless, looking atSocial Learning in a Multi-Agent System 1003
imitation alone may blind us to the potential of much simpler mechanisms through
which the behaviour of one animal can in°uence the learning experience of another.
Clearly, simpler mechanisms have the advantage of being easier to implement in a
human-engineered multi-agent system.
Although biologists sometimes do not understand how social learning occurs,
there is a body of work on why it might occur, i.e., on the conditions under which
it would o®er a selective advantage. Models of cultural transmission [6] and re-
lated phenomena such as \highly horizontal transmission" [8] help to delineate the
conditions under which it will be advantageous for individuals to learn from others
rather than ¯nding things out for themselves. However, these models tend to result
in rather general conclusions. For example, [8] summarize work on cultural trans-
mission by relating it to rates of change in the environment: in static environments,
genetic transmission of hard-wired behaviour patterns can do the job, and in rapidly
changing environments, only individual learning can keep up, whereas at interme-
diate rates of change, social learning will o®er an advantage. Results like these are
useful, but to get a complete picture of social learning we also need to understand
the mechanisms involved.
Individual-based simulations, as used in arti¯cial life research, represent an excel-
lent way of exploring possible social learning mechanisms. ALife models of this type
have certainly been explored in related domains such as communication, dominance
and territorial behaviour, and °ocking or schooling. There are also a signi¯cant
number of robotics researchers who share the primatologists' interest in imitation
and see it as a way of improving human{robot or robot{robot communication [?]for
a review of this work see>schaal99.
However, as yet relatively few ALife models have looked at social learning using
mechanisms simpler than imitation. One example is the work of [11] who constructed
a simulation of foraging and nesting behaviour in egrets. They used their model
to demonstrate that learning socially about the location of food, through simply
approaching other birds, is more likely to evolve when food resources are patchy
rather than evenly distributed. [11] suggest that °ock foraging and colonial roosting
may be based on this principle. In the same vein, [10] considered the selective
pressures a®ecting social learning about food in Norway rats. They found that
a surprisingly simple strategy, which involved ignoring signs of food poisoning in
others, was favoured as long as toxins were very dangerous. This ¯nding was used
to explain apparently paradoxical aspects of rat behaviour.
[9] have previously argued that a focus on imitation has led to the power of
simpler social learning processes being underestimated; they describe a number of
candidate simple mechanisms, and encourage the use of simulation models as a
way of demonstrating the potential of such mechanisms. The purpose of the current
paper is to follow up on this work by instantiating some of the mechanisms discussed
by [9], in a simple environment that re°ects the learning challenges faced by a
hypothetical animal or agent. The central aim is to show that simple mechanisms
for social learning can perform well under the right environmental circumstances. We
hope to thereby demonstrate that imitative learning has received a disproportionate1004 J. Noble, D.W. Franks
amount of attention. We also hope to show by analogy that designers of multi-agent
systems could improve the performance of their agents by moving beyond individual
learning and incorporating social learning.
We must stress that even though our simulated agents are inspired by several
di®erent primates, our goal is not to model learning in any particular species, but
to set up a speci¯c, controlled environment in which the performance of di®erent
social learning strategies can be compared.
In looking at the data that is output by our simulation, we adopted the per-
spective of an observer who records agent behaviour and tries to come up with
conclusions about the underlying learning mechanisms. [9] make the point, follow-
ing [7], that human observers of animal and robot behaviour have a propensity to
invoke mechanisms that are more complex than those strictly needed to explain that
behaviour. For example, the presence of a distinctive behaviour pattern across all
members of a group could be taken as evidence for sophisticated social learning, but
might result simply from similar individual learning experiences. We hope to show
that much of the data a ¯eld observer might plausibly collect about a population
could easily lead them astray in theorizing about what the agents were really doing.
2 THE SIMULATION
The environment consists of a 10 £ 10 toroidal grid world, in which each square is
either empty (20%) or contains a resource (80%). In addition, a grid square may
contain a tool that agents are free to pick up and take away; agents may also drop
tools. Agents occupy one square at a time, and more than one agent can occupy
the same square. At each time step an agent chooses one of 12 distinct actions,
and performing an action may lead to positive or negative payo®s depending on the
context. An agent's choice of action is based on feeding its perceptual state into a
reinforcement learning algorithm and choosing the action with the highest expected
payo® (with a 20% chance of choosing a random action, in order to encourage
exploration). Agents can perceive their local resource and the available tools | one
on the ground and one in their grasp | as well as the presence of other agents (see
Figure 1). They can also perceive the resource type in a randomly selected square
drawn from the eight-square neighbourhood around their current location. If they
choose to move, they will travel to this square.
The environment is deliberately simple, even playful: it is certainly not meant
to be realistic. The guiding principles were, ¯rst, not to include an excessive number
of distinct states, as this would make things di±cult for the agents' reinforcement
learning algorithm, and second, to ensure that some potential rewards were easily
discovered and that others were harder to ¯nd (although possibly made easier with
the right kind of social learning). The names we have given to the various resources,
tools, and actions clearly suggest primate environments and behaviours, but we trust
that the reader can appreciate that the same simulation might equally be used to
model robots or software agents in an appropriate environment.Social Learning in a Multi-Agent System 1005
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Fig. 1. Aspects of the environment that can be perceived by each agent: the focal agent
is in the left-hand grid square, and can perceive its local resource type | in this case
a termite nest | the fact that it is grasping a stick, the presence of another stick on
the ground, the presence of a second agent, and the proximity of a tree in the next
grid square. If the agent chose the travel action, it would move to the tree.
Generally, di®erent resources are associated with distinct payo®s, and require
the right action or sequence of actions to obtain them. The di®erent resource types
are listed below. Actions and tools are shown in italics, means and standard de-
viations for payo®s are shown as ¹ and ¾ respectively, P denotes the prevalence
of that resource in the environment, and n refers to the number of times the re-
source can be used before it is exhausted. An exhausted resource reverts to empty,
and a replacement appears in a randomly chosen empty square elsewhere in the
environment.
Tree: being in the shade of a tree is pleasant, with a small constant reward (¹ = 1,
¾ = 0) regardless of the chosen action. P = 10%, n = 1.
Berries: an easy resource to ¯gure out, berries are assumed to be automatically
eaten (¹ = 10, ¾ = 5) regardless of action. If the agent shakes the berry bush,
twice the payo® is obtained (¹ = 20, ¾ = 5). P = 10%, n = 20.
Nettles: normally cause a nasty sting (¹ = ¡10, ¾ = 5) regardless of action but
if an agent folds the nettle leaves, they can be safely eaten (¹ = 30, ¾ = 5).
P = 10%, n = 20.
Termite nest: the best way to get a meal of termites is to poke the nest with a
peeled stick (¹ = 100, ¾ = 20) | the termites swarm on the stick and the agent1006 J. Noble, D.W. Franks
can lick it clean. Also a reward for poking with a stick (¹ = 50, ¾ = 10) or
without any tool (¹ = 20, ¾ = 5). Bashing the nest with a stone or a big stone
will get some termites (¹ = 35, ¾ = 10). P = 10%, n = 10.
Coconuts: need to be bashed to have a chance of opening them and getting the
milk (¹ = 150, ¾ = 20). P = 10%, n = 5. Chance of successfully opening a
coconut depends on whether stones or big stones are available in hand and on
the ground.
On ground
Nothing Stone Big stone
Holding
None 0.01 0.01 0.01
Stone 0.2 0.6 1.0
Big stone 0.4 0.6 0.8
Monkeys: can be caught and eaten (¹ = 200, ¾ = 20) if an agent chases them, but
only if a second agent is present to block their escape route. Alternatively an
agent can throw a stone for a 10% chance of success, or throw a stick, a peeled
stick, or a big stone for a 2% chance of success. P = 10%, n = 2.
Thorns: are painful (¹ = ¡20, ¾ = 5) regardless of action. P = 10%, n = 1.
Beehive: there is a 20% chance that the bees will °y out and sting the agent
(¹ = ¡200, ¾ = 50) regardless of action. P = 5%, n = 1. If the agent shakes,
pokes, or bashes the hive the chance of stinging is 100%. The hardest trick to
learn is getting honey from the hive (¹ = 500, ¾ = 50, n = 1): the agent must
either bash the nest with a stone or a big stone for a 50% chance of success (and
a 100% chance of getting stung) or smoke the bees out by starting a ¯re, i.e.,
rubbing two sticks of either type together (one on the ground and one in the
hand).
Wasp nest: the same negative properties as the beehive but with no chance of
reward. P = 5%, n = 1.
An important action not covered above is scratching, which leads to a modest
reward (¹ = 1, ¾ = 0; ¹ = 2 if the agent is carrying either kind of stick) regardless
of the local resource. Scratching provides a kind of local optimum, in that it is easy
for an agent to get locked into pursuing the modest rewards of this activity, perhaps
under a tree, rather than moving around looking for more pro¯table resources.
Other actions include peeling, which converts a stick in the agent's hand into a
peeled stick; swapping, which exchanges the tool on the ground, if any, for the one in
the agent's hand, if any; and travelling, which moves the agent to the nearby resource
they have most recently seen. Note that when an agent attempts an irrelevant action,
such as bashing a tree, the payo® is always zero.
Tools are distributed generously, with 40 sticks, 20 stones, and 20 large stones
present in the environment. Peeled sticks only appear if an agent peels a stick.
Stones do not wear out, but sticks and peeled sticks break after 1000 or 500 time
steps respectively; a replacement stick appears at a random location.Social Learning in a Multi-Agent System 1007
2.1 Reinforcement learning agents
The agent population is 25, but initially agents enter the world one at a time. Every
400 timesteps a new agent is born. When 25 agents are present, the oldest agent
is always killed o® to make room for the youngest; an agent's lifespan is therefore
10,000 timesteps. The middle-aged agent born 12 places ahead of a newborn is
nominally regarded as its parent, and the new agent appears in the same square.
The simulation is run for 100,000 time steps, or 10 agent lifetimes. Even though the
simulation has \generations" of a sort, there is no genetic aspect to agent behaviour:
each individual comes into the world as a blank slate and must learn for itself how
to maximize payo®s.
Each agent makes its decisions on the basis of a history of reinforcement: it
has learned to associate some states and actions with a reward and others with
punishment. The di®erent social learning mechanisms implemented all assume this
underlying capacity for reinforcement learning. The speci¯c learning algorithm used
was Q-learning [12] which allows an agent to take into account not just immediate
but also delayed payo®s. This would be important, for example, in realizing that a
higher long-term payo® could be gained by picking up and peeling a stick rather than
just poking the termite nest immediately. The learning rate was 0.1, the temporal
discounting factor was 0.5, and the proportion of random actions was 0.2.
Q-learning in its simplest form does not include any generalization: if an agent
learns that it is good to shake a berry bush when there is a stone on the ground, it will
not automatically transfer that knowledge to the case where there is no stone on the
ground. Given 60,000 state-action pairs1 and a lifetime of only 10,000 timesteps it is
clear that an agent could not exhaustively sample its space of perceived situations.
We therefore included some basic generalization: after updating a state-action pair
through Q-learning, all other state-action pairs that di®ered only in terms of the tools
available, the presence of others, and the resource seen in the distance (exception:
the resource being left behind for the travel action) also had their expected returns
updated by a small amount in the same direction.
2.2 Implementing social learning
To ¯nd baseline levels for payo®s in this environment, we looked at the performance
of agents with completely random behaviour, and at that of agents capable only of
individual learning. We then implemented three of the simple mechanisms described
by [9]: following or stimulus enhancement, contagious behaviour, and emulation.
In addition, we implemented a version of imitative learning. Finally, we looked
at the performance obtained when following was combined with each of the other
mechanisms.
Following: (otherwise known as stimulus enhancement) is implemented simply by
1 10 resources £ 5 tool-on-ground options £ 5 tool-in-hand options £ 2 others-present
options £ 10 next-resource options £ 12 actions = 60,000.1008 J. Noble, D.W. Franks
having each agent occupy the same square as its parent for the ¯rst 25% of its
lifetime. Beyond that, agents learn for themselves.
Contagious behaviour: if another agent is present, there is a 10% probability that
the ¯rst agent will do whatever the second just did. An instinctive behavioural
contagion is assumed, as when one person's yawning stimulates another to yawn;
actions are equally likely to be copied regardless of their payo®.
Emulation: if another agent is present and obtains a non-zero payo®, the ¯rst
agent adjusts its estimated return for all state-action pairs related to its current
state. The idea is that the agent has become aware of an a®ordance in the local
environment, but has no idea about what speci¯c action is needed to exploit it.
Imitation: if another agent is present and obtains a non-zero payo®, the ¯rst agent
is able to take the perspective of the second. The ¯rst agent notes the perceptual
state of the other, as well as the action the other chose, and updates its own
relevant state-action pair accordingly. The advance on emulation is that the ¯rst
agent not only knows which action achieved the reward, but also can perceive
the other agent's state as opposed to its own (e.g., it might be holding a stick).
2.3 Data collection
How can we collect data from this simulation that parallels the data that ¯eld
observers would collect when watching real animals? We assumed that observers
watched the population for the ¯nal 1000 timesteps; i.e., they had a snapshot of
the group's behaviour rather than being able to observe the rise and fall of socially
transmitted behaviours in the long term. We then looked at the average payo® per
agent during these 1000 timesteps. We can imagine that observers look atdistinct
groups in similar environments and compare the average energy intake across groups.
It is natural to assume that a population equipped with a richer social learning ability
will be able to extract more energy from its environment.
We also wanted to measure behavioural convergence, i.e., the degree to which the
various members of the population tend to choose the same action when faced with
the same situation. This was done by compiling a list of 1000 states perceived by
members of the population (the state of a randomly chosen individual was noted at
each timestep). Then all 25 members of the population were faced with each of the
1000 states in turn, and the proportion of individuals who chose the modal response
for each state was recorded and averaged. We can imagine that our observers have
an outstanding ability to set up naturalistic experiments in the ¯eld, and are able
to engineer things so that each member of the population can be placed into the
same series of states and allowed to choose an action.
We looked at behavioural convergence because uniformity of behaviour within
a population, especially when combined with behavioural variation across popula-
tions, is usually taken as a sign that social learning is going on. For example, if
one group is observed to hunt monkeys by chasing them down, while another group
tends to throw stones at them, then it seems to follow that each animal is not arriv-Social Learning in a Multi-Agent System 1009
ing at its own solution to the problem, but rather is being in°uenced by its fellow
group members.
Finally, we looked at simple counts of the occurrence of various behaviours: the
performance of more complex and hard-to-learn behaviours would probably be taken
as a sign of sophisticated social learning. So, for example, if one species has mastered
the trick of peeling sticks before poking them into termite nests, and another related
species has not, one might assume that the former species has a better social learning
faculty.
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
All of the learning mechanisms, both individual and social, ensured that the agents
did far better than they would by choosing a random action. Figure 2 shows that the
mean payo® per agent per timestep was at least 6 units; the mean payo® for random
behaviour was ¡8:997 units. Behaviours such as scratching, eating berries, folding
nettle leaves, and poking termite nests (although not often with tools) were all quite
common and allowed the agents to extract a good return from the environment.
Omitting for a moment the cases in which following is combined with another
mechanism, we have the surprising result that the best mean payo® is for emula-
tion, not imitative learning. Why does this occur? Emulation means that an agent
increases its estimated return for all state-action pairs associated with any state in
which it witnesses another agent receiving a positive payo®. E®ectively this means
that emulation encourages exploration around bene¯cial resources, and results in
more inquisitive agents who are persistent enough to crack a tricky resource like
nettle leaves. Imitators, on the other hand, are quite conservative. Imitative learn-
ing is sophisticated enough to allow an agent to pick up any clever trick it might
witness, but imitators appear to be caught in a vicious circle in which the only role
models they observe are other conservative imitators (see the behavioural pro¯les in
Figure 4).
Figure 2 also shows that the simple matter of following your parent around for
the ¯rst quarter of your life is enough to increase your mean payo® signi¯cantly.
This is more impressive than it seems, as the imposition of following behaviour
threatens to decrease payo®s by increasing feeding competition: a resource will run
out twice as fast if it is being consumed by both parent and child. Contagious
behaviour, on the other hand, did not do any better than individual learning. It
may be that occasional instinctive copying is unhelpful because agents already try
random actions 20% of the time and will thus reach the same result in the end.
When following behaviour is combined with other mechanisms, the story be-
comes more complex. It is obviously not the case that following and the other three
mechanisms mesh together in a simple additive fashion: the e±ciency of imitation
and contagious behaviour is increased, but the e±ciency of emulation is decreased.
Clearly it is important to imitate or emulate the right people: an experienced parent
in one case, and a random cross-section of society in the other.1010 J. Noble, D.W. Franks
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
IL Foll. CB Emul. Imit. F/C F/E F/I
M
e
a
n
 
p
a
y
o
f
f
Learning mechanism
Fig. 2. Mean payo® per agent per timestep across the di®erent learning conditions: indi-
vidual learning, following, contagious behaviour, emulation, imitation, following with
contagious behaviour, following with emulation, and following with imitation. Each
data point is averaged across 10 runs, and is shown §1 standard error.
Behavioural convergence (Figure 3) was 0:55 even in the individual learning
case. The convergence score for random behaviour was inevitably much lower at
0.18, and thus we are reminded that similar behaviour may be brought about by
similar learning experiences rather than any form of social learning. Convergence
was highest in the two imitation conditions, which makes sense. However, the low
convergence for emulation belies the fact that these agents were doing well in terms of
mean payo®, and convergence rates are the same across the two imitation conditions,
despite the fact that it is only in the following / imitation condition that high payo®s
are achieved. An observation of high or low behavioural convergence, which might
lead one to suspect the presence or absence of e®ective social learning, is meaningless
considered alone.
Figure 4 shows frequency counts for several behaviours across the di®erent condi-
tions. It shows that di®erent learning mechanisms lead to quite di®erent behavioural
pro¯les, e.g., emulators spend a lot of time folding nettle leaves, whereas imitators
have mastered the art of shaking berry bushes. It is not simply the case that the
more \advanced" the social learning mechanism, the more behaviours are added toSocial Learning in a Multi-Agent System 1011
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Fig. 3. Behavioural convergence across the di®erent learning conditions. Each data point
is averaged across 10 runs, and is shown §1 standard error.
the repertoire.
Another surprising ¯nding is that some behaviours that would seem to suit
imitative learning, such as learning to peel a stick and then poke it into a termite
nest, are in fact more often performed by agents with simpler mechanisms (Figure 4,
bottom). Agents who follow their parents are the ones who do this most often. Even
so, it seems that this behaviour was largely too hard: note the low frequency counts
overall. Imitators could certainly have picked up this trick, but again it seems they
did not have access to the right role models.
4 CONCLUSIONS
We hope to have demonstrated that complex imitative learning is not always going
to be the best strategy in a multi-agent system, and that the e®ectiveness of any
social learning strategy will depend on details of the environment and additional
facts about the agents' lifestyles. We readily admit that the impressive performance
of emulation in our model, for example, is not likely to be a general result, but is tied
to the particulars of the simulated environment and the underlying reinforcement
learning system. But that is exactly the point.1012 J. Noble, D.W. Franks
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Fig. 4. Frequencies with which various behaviours were observed across the di®erent learn-
ing conditions: from top to bottom, scratching, shaking berry bushes, folding nettle
leaves, and poking termite nests with peeled sticks. Each data point is averaged
across 10 runs, and is shown §1 standard error.Social Learning in a Multi-Agent System 1013
The argument which inspired this paper [9] had two aspects: ¯rst, simpler social
learning mechanisms are inherently more likely to evolve; one reason for this is that
complex mechanisms such as imitation will involve signi¯cant costs. It follows that
we should look for simple mechanisms in nature. Second, in cases of doubt about
which mechanism is at work, from an epistemological point of view it is good practice
to start by proposing simpler mechanisms. The current simulation results show that
an even stronger argument is possible: even if imitation was available via a cost-
free, one-step mutation, it sill might not be the best learning mechanism for a given
species.
We believe our model also shows that observers comparing how well two di®erent
groups of animals get on in similar environments, or looking at data on \traditions"
or \proto-cultural behaviour" (i.e., behavioural convergence) may ¯nd that data to
be quite misleading as to the underlying social learning mechanisms at work. It is
not the case, for example, that low behavioural convergence necessarily means an
absence of social learning. One has to be careful in looking at exactly how behaviours
are transmitted from one individual to another. Theories about the adaptive value
of social learning, such as [8], are useful, but ideally we want to move beyond such
theories and look at hypotheses about the utility of a particular mechanism in a
particular environment.
We deliberately omitted an evolutionary dimension from the current model as
we wanted to look at the e®ects of learning alone. However, future work could
incorporate an evolutionary aspect, in which di®erent social learning mechanisms
were selected for over generational time. The mean payo® results certainly suggest
that this would not be a straightforward story of hill-climbing with imitation at the
peak. Let us assume that a single-step mutation F controls following behaviour, and
a two-step mutation leads from individual learning to emulation (S1) and thence to
imitative learning (S2). This latter assumption is reasonable as imitative learning
can be seen as a \sharpened" version of emulation. For an evolving population of
individual learners, the ¯nal strategy will be emulation if S1 occurs ¯rst, as F and
S2 will both be associated with a loss in ¯tness. On the other hand, if F occurs ¯rst,
both S1 and then S2 will mean increases in ¯tness, and the population will end up
as follower / imitators.
It seems, then, that a focus on imitation as the only kind of social learning
worth having is misplaced. Researchers interested in imitation as a potential tool
for instructing robots or software agents would do well to consider giving their
creations more spartan mechanisms, which have the bene¯t of being far easier to
design and implement, and are inherently more likely to prove robust due to their
very simplicity. Assuming that an agent is equipped with a general reinforcement
learning system, our results suggest that it would be a good start to simply have it
follow around a more experienced agent, such as a human being.
More generally, if we aspire to build systems that include multiple agents that
need to learn about their environment, we could do worse than to start by looking
at how social learning allows information to be shared in a nest of rats, a °ock of
birds, or a troop of monkeys. The evidence from the biological literature and from1014 J. Noble, D.W. Franks
the simulation presented here is that, with respect to multi-agent learning, much
can be achieved with simple mechanisms.
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